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Philosophical & Sociological Inquires in Material Aspects of the Human Life 
namely Risk, Finance and Insurance 
 
Description 
 
Given how much importance there is of economics and finance in our lives as humans (materialist 
side is foremost as per Marx), it should be given more importance by Philosophy and Sociology. 
This brief report is meant to highlight few research paradigms available in Philosophy and Sociology 
to give its proper social context and provide deep underlying of Risk, Insurance and Finance.   
 
Sociology of Risk and Other Areas 
Sociology of risk1 
A number of key insights on sociology of risk have been elucidated by the previous sections. Here, 
we emphasize that although sociology of risk attracts a lot of research activities, it is important to 
categorize it according to their core ideas. The three main categories are: 
 risk in (rational) decision-making,  
 risk in calculative-probabilistic calculation and  
 risk as part of a modern worldview.  
Different sides to the epistemological status of risk can be shown with following different 
approaches to sociology of risk. The early cultural approach argues that while risks are real, they are 
socially constructed by the particular configuration of a society with its members and external 
factors. Chiefly, how risks are selected and prioritized is politicalization of risks achieved by key 
institutions in the society.  
From the radical constructivist perspective of governmentality and systems theory, we deduce that 
risks are not created, they are manufactured and proliferation of risks can serve very different 
purposes than what appears on the surface. Objective probability and statistics is applied to create a 
new field of knowledge and specialists which have more power than other laymen. This „bio-politics‟ 
quantifies calamities and individuals into age, happiness, gender, health status, frequency and severity 
and in the process creates a powerful system of governing, controlling and surveying the population. 
In this surveillance society, growing concerns about risk are not a result of the quality of risk or a 
specific culture but of how the liberal societies are actually governed. 
Systems theory pictures society as existing in its communications and so risk is a way of 
communication and discovering for the agents in the society. There is conflict based framework of 
society and social risks arise because some groups create and divert risks to other parties as 
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externalities to avoid any blame or reprehension. Gains are however privatized and remains within 
the powerful groups. Systems theory sees growing risk communication as a result of ongoing 
economic inequality and societal differentiation, which fuels negotiations about who is responsible 
for undesired societal events and increases chances and sharpness of direct confrontations. 
(Luhmann 1993; Japp and Kusche 2008). 
Finally, Beck emphasizes that new risks are increasingly threatening modern civilization. Aside from 
natural catastrophes, man-made manufactured risks are now larger than ever before and it is 
becoming extremely hard to even quantify their impacts.  
As can be seen, the governmentality approach can be seen as very relevant to actuarial practices. It is 
argued that group differences created by historical processes of domination are demoralized by 
actuarial representations (as they are for instance in insurance premium setting) it becomes more 
difficult for disadvantaged groups to generate political power. This is because sensitive stratifications 
like gender, credit profiles and pricing elasticities etc are living realities of the people whereas in 
classification for actuarial ratemaking, they are stripped off their subjectivities and transformed into 
an objective formal reality. The moral charge carried by these forms of differences are eliminated 
and so actuarial ratemaking classification “with its de-centered subject, seems to eliminate, in 
advance, the possibility of identity, of critical self-consciousness and of intersubjectivity (cf. 
Habermas, 1979). Rather than making people up, actuarial practices unmake them.” 
Data derivatives2 
Data derivatives are combination of vast data and learning correlations and association rules from it. 
This leads us not to certainties but to probabilities and yet the practical impact is that we decide our 
precautions based on result from these data derivatives to sustain in face of ever emerging and 
increasing risks. Data derivatives drives pre-emption not by predicting the future but by projecting 
fragments of data onto possible futures, producing a form of encoded intuition. As the associations 
are ephemeral, time sensitive, only correlated and do not show causation, it practically feels like 
calculated gambling. This is why it is termed „derivative‟ of data as it is clear that data derivative 
emerges from the practices of speculative business like from the realms of derivatives trading and 
expands into other realms by proliferation of data science. 
Sociology of Life Insurance3 
Sociology of life insurance is very interesting because it seems so absurd, historically that people will 
accept the sacred time and event of death as a chance to earn money and security. As XYZ says: 
“With life insurance, man and money, the sacred and the profane, were thrown together. Life 
insurance threatened the sanctity of life by pricing it. In the earlier part of the 19th century, the 
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American public was not ready to commercialize death. Life insurance was rejected as a sacrilegious 
enterprise.” 
Life insurance was a business like any other with profit maximization as its main reason for 
existence. However, the profit justification seemed too base for an institution of its kind which deals 
with such sensitive, sacred product of death over a very long term. Given these circumstances, how 
did life insurance became common in our modern societies and overcame the resistance to such an 
initiative? 
Two chief historical reasons can be sociologically deduced from analysis of historical documents and 
trends. The first is that life insurance responded by playing „fire with fire‟; as they were seen as un-
religious by trying to commoditize death, they infact created and assert their own religious image of 
following core ethics and becoming missionaries of the religion of capitalism. Second reason was 
aggressive marketing strategy of agents selling life insurance as „life insurance is sold and not 
bought‟.   
It is widely held that the rapid expansion of capitalism from 19th century and onwards created its 
own secular religion by numerous ways. It created possibility of emancipation by hard work and 
saving capital to accumulate capital, rituals were routines based on office timings, ethics were of hard 
work and repaying debts at due dates with capital as the sovereign overlord. Life insurance seized on 
this core change and disguised its material ambitions in spiritual garb. The company and its 
employees were projected as trust worthy ethical and life-long partners of the policyholders with 
concerns of policyholders as their foremost criteria. Life insurance was portrayed as a social good in 
capitalism as death will now not lead to insecurity or poverty to those affected. As Zelizer continues 
“Indeed, by the latter part of the 19th century, when American business felt sufficiently confident to 
seek no other justification than the wealth it produced, life insurance still retained part of its religious 
camouflage. Even some of the most hard-bitten business leaders of the industry slipped into 
sentimentalism in speaking of life insurance as a “conviction first and then a business” (Kingsley 
1911, p. 13).” 
Secondly, the distinctive and vital role of the agent in life insurance was a response to powerful 
client resistance. Persuasive and persistent personal solicitation alone could break through the 
ideological and superstitious barriers of the public against insuring life.” While the companies trained 
the agents to market themselves to consumers as above materialistic concerns and showcase their 
ethics and tasks with missionary-level spiritual devotion, the highest rewards went to the successful 
salesman who sold the most policies. 
  
Philosophy in Insurance 
These are perspective-changing and incredibly invaluable excerpts from the essay „insurance and 
risk‟ by the philosophy Francois Ewald4. In the end, terrorism extract is given. In few pages Francois 
is gracefully able to explain the underlying mechanisms that take a whole life to experience and 
realize. 
“Insurance designates not so much a concept as an abstract technology. Using the vocabulary of the 
nineteenth-century actuaries, economists and publicists, we can say that the technology of insurance 
is an art of 'combinations'. Not that insurance is itself a combination, but it is something which, on 
the basis of a technology of risk, makes possible a range of insurance combinations shaped to suit 
their assigned function and intended utility-effect. Considered as a technology, insurance is an art of 
combining various elements of economic and social reality according to a set of specific rules. 
The particular form insurance technology takes in a given institution at a given moment depends on 
an insurantial imaginary: that is to say, on the ways in which, in a given social context, profitable, 
useful and necessary uses can be found for insurance technology. Thus, the birth of social insurance 
at the end of the nineteenth century needs Insurance technology and actuarial science did not fall 
from the mathematical skies to incarnate themselves in institutions. They were built up gradually out 
of multiple practices which they reflected and rationalized, practices of which they were more effects 
than causes, and it would be wrong to imagine that they have now assumed a definite shape. 
 
Insurance can be defined as a technology of risk. As a technology of risk, insurance is first and 
foremost a schema of rationality, a way of breaking down, rearranging, ordering certain elements of 
reality. The expression 'taking risks', used to characterize the spirit of enterprise, derives from the 
application of this type of calculus to economic and financial affairs. 
Rather than with the notions of danger and peril, the notion of risk goes together with those of 
chance, hazard, probability, eventuality or randomness on the one hand, and those of loss or damage 
on the other - the two series coming together in the notion of accident. 
 
The insurer's activity is not just a matter of passively registering the existence of risks, and then 
offering guarantees against them. He 'produces risks, he makes risks appear where each person had 
hitherto felt obliged to submit resignedly to the blows of fortune. It is characteristic of insurance 
that it constitutes a certain type of objectivity, giving certain familiar events a kind of reality which 
alters their nature. By objectivizing certain events as risks, insurance can invert their meanings: it can 
make what was previously an obstacle into a possibility. Insurance assigns a new mode of existence 
to previously dreaded events; it creates value: 
 
Insurance is one of those practices linked to what Pascal called the 'geometry of hazard' or 'algebra 
of chances ' and is today called the calculus of probabilities. 
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Essay pgs 197 to 211: “Insurance and Risk” 
The mutualities created by insurance have special characteristics: they are abstract mutualities, unlike 
the qualitative mutualities of the family, the corporation, the union, the commune. One 'belongs ' to 
the latter kinds of mutuality to the extent that one respects their particular duties, hierarchies, 
orderings. The family has its rules, the trade union its internal regulations. These mutualities place 
one, moralize one, educate one, form one's conscience. Insurance mutualities are different: they 
leave the person free. Insurance provides a form of association which combines a maximum of 
socialization with a maximum of individualization. It allows people to enjoy the advantages of 
association while still leaving them free to exist as individuals. It seems to reconcile those two 
antagonists, society-socialization and individual liberty. This, as we will see, is what makes for its 
political success. 
 
Insurance does not, as has been mistakenly said, eliminate chance, but it fixes its scope; it does not 
abolish loss, but ensures that loss, by being shared, is not felt. Insurance is the mechanism through 
which this sharing is operated. It modifies the incidence of loss, diverting it from the individual to 
the community. It substitutes a relation of extension for a relation of intensity.? 
 
As Proudhon explained: 
The savings bank, mutuality and life assurance are excellent things for those who enjoy a certain 
comfort and wish to safeguard it, but they remain quite fruitless, not to say inaccessible, for the 
poorer classes. Security is a commodity bought like any other: and as its rate of tariff falls in 
proportion not with the misery of the buyer but with the magnitude of the amount he insures, 
insurance proves itself a new privilege for the rich and a cruel irony for the poor. 
 
Insurance possesses several distinct dimensions of technique. In the first place, it is an economic and 
financial technique. 
 
Secondly, insurance is a moral technology. To calculate a risk is to master time, to discipline the 
future. To conduct one's life in the manner of an enterprise indeed begins in the eighteenth century 
to be a definition of a morality whose cardinal virtue is providence. To provide for the future does 
not just mean not living from day to day and arming oneself against ill fortune, but also 
mathematizing one's commitments. Above all, it means no longer resigning oneself to the decrees of 
providence and the blows of fate, but instead transforming one 's relationships with nature, the 
world and God so that, even in misfortune, one retains responsibility for one's affairs by possessing 
the means to repair its effects. 
 
Behind this problem of guarantees there lies another, profounder one, namely the problem of the 
permanence of insurance institutions. Since they are supposed to be providing security, these need 
to have a quasi-infinite longevity. With insurance one comes to experience a sort of dilation of 
timescales, stretched out to span not just one generation or lifetime but several, and thus positing 
the survival of society for an indefinite future. One moves from a limited conception of time bound 
to the life of individuals, to a social time measured against the life of society, actualizing the Comtian 
conception of progress which founds the idea of solidarity as formulated in the political theory of 
solidarisme. In guaranteeing security, the state is equally guaranteeing itself its own existence, 
maintenance, permanence. Social insurance is also an insurance against revolutions.” 
Selected excerpt from terrorism insurance by Aradau et al are:5 
“What interests us is not so much these technologies per se, but rather what political imaginary 
makes them possible and what political imaginary they enact. Insurance starts by classifying and 
objectifying phenomena in order to be able to calculate the degree of chance or risk. Insurance has 
its own science, actuarialism, which claims to be able to assess risks in order to commodify them 
(Ericson et al., 2003: 8). The first imperative of insurance is to define. The insurance industry needs 
to define terrorism, create a calculable rendering of terrorism and constitute the subject who is to be 
insured. For even when the mathematical calculus of probability finds itself surpassed by 
catastrophic events and other means of governing more akin to the game model are proposed, 
insurance still relies upon classifications and definitions of what and who is to be insured. The other 
imperative of insurance is to represent the future and its relation to the present. In attempting to 
neutralize or even prevent the possibility of „dangerous irruptions‟ (Castel, 1991) in the future, 
insurance also colonizes the future.” 
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Sociology of finance 
Introduction 
Emmanuel Derman, a leading quant, advocates that there is enough mathematics in finance already; 
what we need is imagination.6 Perhaps this void can be filled by sociology of finance.  
Sociology of finance is defined as “the systematic study of financial markets and transactions from 
a sociological perspective. The goal is to develop a rich and in-depth understanding of 
the financial markets from an interdisciplinary perspective.”7  
Many disciplines and professions other than sociology can gain from a better understanding of social 
aspects of finance such as those in the economics and finance fields. The aim of this report is to 
investigate various sociological ideas, concepts and applications to finance. These areas are quite 
broad, distinct from each other but it is imperative to discuss these so as to have an in depth 
understanding of the various paradigms of sociology of finance.  These concepts are grouped in the 
following sections in this report; 
1. Cultural construction of finance 
2. The social-constructive cognitions of financial analysts 
3. Financial engineering and the financial crisis 
Cultural constructions of finance 
Cultural construction As per Suttles linguistic research on the use of the word „economy‟, Suttles 
discovers that the modern usage of the word „economy‟ as a system of exchange, production and 
consumption was not existent in 1929 crisis and only assumed its modern usage when Keynes 
introduced it in 1934. The 1929 crises was seen as a crises in business, not the economy and the 
social metaphor used to describe it was „business‟ (instead of economy) which was a natural 
occurring activity which was self-correcting but sometimes sick as well. Over the next few decades 
this metaphor changed and now the economy was viewed as a „grand machine‟ that can be 
controlled by social engineering of economic and social policies. By 1987 and onwards, 
embezzlements, shady products, deregulation, massive innovation in products and technology meant 
that the economy had become a „casino‟.8  
Starting from 2008 financial crises and onwards, economy is primarily thought of as a computer 
network or information system. The viruses of default freezes credit and spread throughout global 
networks which crashes the economy.9 These metaphors increasingly bring the fragility and 
vulnerability of the economy onto the surface to make us realize that we live in a „risk society‟ 
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(Ulrich Beck) where risk is globally being created and leads to massive scales of crashes in the 
economy.10  
These shifts in the core metaphors point towards ideological shifts. Such shifts occur most 
abundantly in times of crises where uncertainty reigns supreme and institutional guides to behavior 
are no longer relevant. It is in such times that metaphors pack the uncertainties in a symbolic 
manner to guide the people like a map in an unknown territory.11 
Financial crises are also symbolic and ritual events. Financial crises arise with an apocalyptic anxiety 
that something we never predicted happened and is causing the end of our world as we know it. 
Over time, this initial anxiety transforms into passiveness of „learned helplessness‟ (Martin 
Seligman12) which teaches us that we have no control over these external torments and this leads to 
pessimistic outlook of the society at that point in time. There is also „atoning‟ or repenting where the 
public rage over accountability forces the parties responsible to at least acknowledge their role in the 
crises and what they did wrong.13 
Another key concept in sociology of finance is time-space compression. Due to globalization in the 
post-modern era, we continuously face „time-space compression‟ in finance. This refers to increasing 
capacity of capital to be available and transmitted across geographical barriers within moments and 
not delayed by time. This has been brought possible by globalization and technological advances. 
But this bridging of time and space has proceeded in a highly unequal manner. As time-space 
compression increases the power of global capital centers like Wall Street and city of London, others 
offering fewer opportunities for profit have continuously found themselves pushed further away in 
relative economic continuum.14 
Time space compression along with other social trends towards polarization means that there is not 
just increasing economic inequality but also social and cultural differentiation. Oxfam officially 
showed that now top 1% own more than the remaining 99%.15 We also have historically high gini 
coefficient which is a metric for measuring economic inequality. We are witnessing the development 
of differential modes of treatment of populations, which aim to maximize the returns on doing what 
is profitable and to marginalize the unprofitable. Instead of segregating and eliminating undesirable 
elements from the social body, or reintegrating them more or less forcibly through corrective or 
therapeutic interventions, the emerging tendency is to assign different social destinies to individuals 
in line with their varying capacity to live up to the requirements of competitiveness and profitability.  
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Taken to its extreme, this yields the model of a 'dual' or 'two-speed' society recently proposed by 
certain French ideologists: the coexistence of hyper-competitive sectors obedient to the harshest 
requirements of economic rationality (we can see this today in P & C sector), and marginal activities 
that provide a refuge (or a dump; social impact bonds; rising charity initiatives all over the world etc) 
for those unable to take part in the circuits of intensive exchange. In one sense this 'dual' society 
already exists in the form of unemployment, marginalized youth, the unofficial economy. But until 
now these processes of disqualification and reclassification have gone on in a blind fashion. They 
have been uncontrolled effects of the mechanisms of economic competition, underemployment, 
adaptation or non-adaptation to new jobs, the hemorrhaging of the educational system, etc. The 
attempts which have been made to reset these processes are more addressed to infrastructures than 
to people: industrial concentration, new investment sectors, closures of non-competitive concerns, 
etc. - leaving their personnel to adjust as well they may, which often means not particularly well, to 
these 'objective' exigencies.16 
The social-constructive cognitions of financial analysts 
Financial analysts are conceptualized in sociology of finance as organizational and institutional 
agents. They regularly maintain hegemonic categories for valuation of financial entities focusing 
primarily on shareholder value perspective.17 
The core process of valuation of fundamentals for equities is to estimate some value indicator for 
the concerned company and relate this indicator to the market price. The difference between such 
fundamental value and market value then reflects whether the company according to the analyst is 
over-valued or undervalued.18  
 
Aside from a micro-company wise analysis, whole markets and sub markets are also analyzed to 
forecast the valuation dynamics of whole markets. Why is such analysis undertaken? This is because 
analysts recognize that market prices can and do swing far away from fundamental valuations over 
long term as well (and not only short term). This is due to a number of sociological workings in the 
financial markets. Analysts recognize the limits of our rationality and the asymmetry of information. 
Not everyone is an equal participant in the market and the spotlight is always fixed upon the market 
movers, the deep pocketed investors that seek alpha returns and create a path for market followers 
to follow through index tracking. Another important concept, long discussed by philosophers and 
sociologists is that of reflexivity. Reflexivity says that we are not just micro agents subject to an all-
powerful macro market. While the market does lead to individual action, a collection of individual 
action, thinking and biases can also change the market and the fundamentals that assist in 
determining the market prices itself.19 
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As a result of these asymmetries, a core suite of analysis is „comparative‟ and „precedent‟ analysis 
which goes on to show that analysts continuously observe each other. Moreover, the use of term 
„market expectations‟ highlight the analysts‟ consensus prominently. These consensuses are 
published by specialized information providers such as Bloomberg and Reuters regularly. 
 
These consensuses are utilized by analysts both when homogenizing their forecasts with these as 
well as when differentiating their forecasts with regard to the consensus. These consensuses are used 
as an „anchor‟ to situate their forecasts in context of the market as well as to identify market 
surprises because of some factors that the consensuses have under-valued or ignored. These 
surprised divergences from the market view are based mostly on fast and frugal heuristics.20  
 
Due to multiple irrational factors in work, a tension or „cognitive dissonance‟ is created between the 
cognitive anticipations of the analysts on how market prices really work and the „fair‟ fundamental 
value of equity. This tension is managed by differentiating the short term basis from the long term 
outlook. Long term outlook is treated as quite differently than short term on the belief of mean 
reversion which is that in the long term, values will converge to the fundamental values.21  
  
Aside from technically seeing market objectively, storytelling is also central to the practices of 
analysts. Selective drawing on qualitative as well as quantitative information in modeling and in their 
narrative is developed in order to tell a story about the company to investors and other parties 
involved with less technical aptitude. The stories are a logical progression that aims to make sense 
and is vital as they absorb differing, heterogeneous, irrational, intuitive information, connect the 
various dots such as connecting past and expected future with the present, and are explainable in 
common sense manner to other investors. These stories facilitate analysts communications with 
clients, arouse and influence trading and increase status differentiation within the various levels of 
community of the analysts.22  
  
But these sociological elements underpinning daily realities of analysts are not without its drawbacks. 
The analyst consensus can lead to withering away of the diversification benefit as if many traders 
lead a similar position on the market, the elements in the variance-covariance matrix that are 
uncorrelated or weakly correlated can suddenly become highly linked. This is what caused LTCM‟s 
diversification to fail in the first place as many other traders took on same or similar positions as 
LTCM was viewed as a winner. These consensuses can and do play their role in perpetuating 
herding behavior and group think where too many similar thoughts and actions lead to a boom or a 
bust in the financial markets.    
 
Financial engineering and the financial crisis 
Finance as per sociology is studied as a „field‟ of markets, government, firms and financial products. 
The field concept recognizes that these elements take each other into account and are 
interconnected. This way of looking at finance like a field enables a holistic view that can potentially 
peak into the bigger picture involved. 
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The social context to proliferation of advanced financial engineering theories can be holistically 
elaborated. The first wave of developments in modern portfolio theory concerned itself with re-
affirming investment practices and wisdom, such as know your business, do not put all your eggs in 
one basket etc, using mathematical language. Theories such as those of Markowitz and Roy, and 
Modigliani and Miller are instances of this wave.23 
The second wave was more ambitious. A deeper economic context was added to the mathematics to 
devise new theories which portray a discrete jump over the first wave which was created mainly to 
validate existing investment practices in order to increase penetration of financial engineering to the 
business and investment communities. Efficient market hypothesis and Capital Asset Pricing Model 
fit the bill for this wave.24  
Amidst this wave, a number of macro-economic changes ushered that led to increased demand for 
financial engineering. Fall of Dollar from the gold standard in 1971, high inflation, and fluctuations 
in commodities lead to rampant volatilities in the financial markets. This is when the Black-Scholes 
formulation of valuing contingent payoffs made it into the lime light as a way to price derivatives 
that were increasingly used to hedge against these volatilities. Ironically, the very instruments made 
to reduce risk lead to a financial meltdown due to the institutional manipulation of such products.   
But these financial models over time did not just describe the models, they transformed them as 
well. Owing to the huge importance these financial models gathered in the markets, they were now 
creating reflexivity by transforming markets after their own images.25  
Derivatives such as modeling-intensive Mortgage Backed Securities and Credit Default Swaps are 
widely credited with being one of the main reasons for the financial crises of 2008. It was believed 
that these allowed for widespread diversification of risks, whereas the financial crises showed that it 
did not lead to diversification of risk as much as its wholesale transfer to others. It was the 
confounding modeling complexity surrounding these contingent cashflows of MBS and CDS that 
meant that no one properly understood them and it enabled the transformation of even the riskiest 
of mortgages into investment grade securities.26  
While this is true, the explosion of these instruments around nonconventional mortgage 
securitization was also, at its core, a product of the structure of sociological relations between firms 
and the state in the market. Even though quants were used to justify MBS, MBS were not made by 
quants themselves. This central feature of all MBSs was thus not the creation of financial economists 
but employees of financial firms who were trying to overcome the objections of potential customers 
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to buying bonds.27 By focusing primarily on the innovative financial instruments themselves, we miss 
the context in which these instruments emerge and assume importance. 
The banking strategy over time shifted from long term retail basis to fees-generating model for 
revenues. MBS were highly profitable as well as large in size which allowed for massive fees to be 
generated. Couple this with increase in leverage being used to further increase profits, and mortgages 
sold even to the riskiest of customers to increase revenue, MBS were utilized to further institutional 
greed. Also the fact that regulations barred the Government state entities from issuing and 
guaranteeing these risky subprime MBS, an alternative means to issue security and make the 
investors comfortable with these products had to be devised. Here is where the quants figure in. 
Quants with their complex statistical models and authoritative scientific feel replaced the traditional 
government guarantees to convince risk-averse investors to buy these products.28  
No matter how aggressively the banks tried to model financial markets and products, they had 
shortcoming in their assumptions and on the fact that no business is separate from its market 
context and realities. Thus even the most sought after models such as Value at Risk, Black Scholes 
etc broke in face of risky bad marketing and selling. All models that previously gave solid results 
melted into air.  
Government was also complacent in a number of ways as a religious and almost fanatic belief over 
the efficient markets hypothesis stifled any initiative to increase regulation (Noam Chomsky29). 
Secondly government was always few steps behind the product innovations and market trends. Alan 
Greenspan famously testified before Congress that he did nothing to halt the rapid growth in 
subprime mortgages as he believed that the banks would not have given the loans if they were 
deemed to be too risky.30 Such thinking reflects undue belief in the capacity of markets to be self-
correcting.  
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Conclusion 
To summarize, we looked briefly at how finance is culturally constructed. We also elaborated on the 
micro choices financial analysts make in part of their daily lives in the hegemonic structure as well as 
seeing toxic structured products in their proper social context. We also covered various areas of 
sociology of risk and presented life insurance in its proper social context. 
 
